Action Concept Firmendaten
action concept gehört zu den führenden unabhängigen Filmproduzenten in Deutschland. Die Primetime-Formate der in Hürth bei Köln ansässigen Filmproduktion. Die action concept Film- und Stuntproduktion GmbH ist ein deutsches Filmproduktionsunternehmen für Actionformate mit Sitz in Hürth bei Köln. Die action concept Film- und Stuntproduktion GmbH ist ein deutsches Filmproduktionsunternehmen für Actionformate mit Sitz in Hürth bei Köln. Das von. Action Concept, Hürth. Gefällt Mal. Impressum: cirqueproductions.euconcept.com/impressum/. Action Concept, Hürth, Germany. 13K likes. Impressum: https://www.cirqueproductions.eu action concept. Wir lieben Film und wir lieben Stunts ! Daher produzieren wir nationale und internationale Actionmovies und -serien: Action made in. Seit 30 Jahren für Spektakel in Film und Fernsehen zuständig: Hermann Joha und sein Unternehmen Action Concept.
Das bietet Dfb Frankreich Concept aus einer Hand. Hai-Alarm auf Mallorca. Und dafür sammelt er weltweit und auch zu Hause Preise ein. Abgrund — Eine Stadt stürzt ein. Im Kern macht der Jährige heute das Gleiche wie vor 30 Jahren: dafür sorgen, dass Action-Szenen in Filmen und Serien möglichst spektakulär aussehen. Where something goes wrong, they suggested, a starting point for many people is to look for another strategy that will address and work within the governing variables.
In other words, given or chosen goals, values, plans and rules are operationalized rather than questioned. According to Argyris and Schön , this is single-loop learning.
An alternative response is to question to governing variables themselves, to subject them to critical scrutiny.
This they describe as double-loop learning. Such learning may then lead to an alteration in the governing variables and, thus, a shift in the way in which strategies and consequences are framed.
See Chris Argyris and double-loop learning. When they came to explore the nature of organizational learning Chris Argyris and Donald Schon described the process as follows:.
When the error detected and corrected permits the organization to carry on its present policies or achieve its presents objectives, then that error-and-correction process is single-loop learning.
Single-loop learning is like a thermostat that learns when it is too hot of too cold and turns the heat on or off.
The thermostat can perform this task because it can receive information the temperature of the room and take corrective action.
Single-loop learning seems to be present when goals, values, frameworks and, to a significant extent, strategies are taken for granted.
Second, they give a new twist to pragmatic learning theory:. In other words, it is not longer necessary to go through the entire learning circle in order to develop the theory further.
It is sufficient to readjust the theory through double-loop learning ibid. To be fair to John Dewey , he did not believe it was necessary to go through a series of set stages in order to learn although he is often represented as doing so.
The notion of double-loop learning adds considerably to our appreciation of experiential learning. Usher et. Technical-rationality is a positivist epistemology of practice.
It involves looking to our experiences, connecting with our feelings, and attending to our theories in use. It entails building new understandings to inform our actions in the situation that is unfolding.
The practitioner allows himself to experience surprise, puzzlement, or confusion in a situation which he finds uncertain or unique.
He reflects on the phenomenon before him, and on the prior understandings which have been implicit in his behaviour.
He carries out an experiment which serves to generate both a new understanding of the phenomenon and a change in the situation.
Schön Significantly, to do this we do not closely follow established ideas and techniques — textbook schemes. We have to think things through, for every case is unique.
However, we can draw on what has gone before. In many respects, Donald Schon is using a distinction here that would have been familiar to Aristotle — between the technical productive and the practical.
We can link this process of thinking on our feet with reflection-on-action. This is done later — after the encounter. Workers may write up recordings, talk things through with a supervisor and so on.
The act of reflecting-on-action enables us to spend time exploring why we acted as we did, what was happening in a group and so on.
In so doing we develop sets of questions and ideas about our activities and practice. The notion of repertoire is a key aspect of this approach.
Practitioners build up a collection of images, ideas, examples and actions that they can draw upon.
Donald Schon, like John Dewey , saw this as central to reflective thought. When a practitioner makes sense of a situation he perceives to be unique, he sees it as something already present in his repertoire.
To see this site as that one is not to subsume the first under a familiar category or rule. It is, rather, to see the unfamiliar, unique situation as both similar to and different from the familiar one, without at first being able to say similar or different with respect to what.
The familiar situation functions as a precedent, or a metaphor, or… an exemplar for the unfamiliar one. In this way we engage with a situation.
When looking at a situation we are influenced by, and use, what has gone before, what might come, our repertoire, and our frame of reference.
We are able to draw upon certain routines. As we work we can bring fragments of memories into play and begin to build theories and responses that fit the new situation.
First, the distinction between reflection in and on action has been the subject of some debate see Eraut and Usher et al There have also been no psychological elaborations of the psychological realities of reflection in action Russell and Munby However, when we take reflection in and on action together it does appear that Schon has hit upon something significant.
However, such processes cannot be repeated in full for everything we do. There is a clear relationship between reflection in and on action. People draw upon the processes, experiences and understandings generated through reflection on action.
In turn, things can be left and returned to. We have to take certain things as read. We have to fall back on routines in which previous thought and sentiment has been sedimented.
It is here that the full importance of reflection-on-action becomes revealed. As we think and act, questions arise that cannot be answered in the present.
The space afforded by recording, supervision and conversation with our peers allows us to approach these. Reflection requires space in the present and the promise of space in the future.
Smith Second, there is some question as to the extent to which his conceptualisation of reflective practice entails praxis.
While there is a clear emphasis on action being informed, there is less focus on the commitments entailed. While he does look at values and interpretative systems, it is the idea of repertoire that comes to the fore.
In other words what he tends to look at is the process of framing and the impact of frame-making on situations:. As [inquirers] frame the problem of the situation, they determine the features to which they will attend, the order they will attempt to impose on the situation, the directions in which they will try to change it.
In this process, they identify both the ends to be sought and the means to be employed. The ability to draw upon a repertoire of metaphors and images that allow for different ways of framing a situation is clearly important to creative practice and is a crucial insight.
We can easily respond in inappropriate ways in situations through the use of an ill-suited frame. However, what we also must hold in view is some sense of what might make for the good see Smith Al It may well be that this failure to attend to method and to problematize the production of his models and ideas has also meant that his contribution in this area has been often used in a rather unreflective way by trainers.
As such they have suffered from being approached in ways that would have troubled Donald Schon. For him reflective practice was to be enacted.
In a similar fashion, his work with Chris Argyris still features very strongly in debates around organizational learning and the possibilities, or otherwise, of learning organizations.
Interestingly, though, it is difficult to find a sustained exploration of his contribution as a whole. While there are discussions of different aspects of his thinking e.
This is a great pity. Going back to books like Beyond the Stable State pays great dividends. Argyris, M. This short array of contrasts and others like them has motivated questions about the nature, variety, and identity of action.
Beyond the matter of her moving, when the person moves her head, she may be indicating agreement or shaking an insect off her ear. Or should we think that there is a single action describable in a host of ways?
However, it is tricky to explicate the purported tie between the two concepts. Second, the notion that human behavior is often intentional under one description but not under another is itself hard to pin down.
For example, as Davidson pointed out, an agent may intentionally cause himself to trip, and the activity that caused the tripping may have been intentional under that description while, presumably, the foreseen but involuntary tripping behavior that it caused is not supposed to be intentional under any heading.
Nevertheless, both the tripping and its active cause are required to make it true that the agent intentionally caused himself to trip.
So further clarification is called for. There has been a notable or notorious debate about whether the agent's reasons in acting are causes of the action — a longstanding debate about the character of our common sense explanations of actions.
Some philosophers have maintained that we explain why an agent acted as he did when we explicate how the agent's normative reasons rendered the action intelligible in his eyes.
Finally, recent discussions have revived interest in important questions about the nature of intention and its distinctiveness as a mental state, and about the norms governing rational intending.
It has been common to motivate a central question about the nature of action by invoking an intuitive distinction between the things that merely happen to people — the events they undergo — and the various things they genuinely do.
The latter events, the doings, are the acts or actions of the agent, and the problem about the nature of action is supposed to be: what distinguishes an action from a mere happening or occurrence?
When a spider walks across the table, the spider directly controls the movements of his legs, and they are directed at taking him from one location to another.
Those very movements have an aim or purpose for the spider, and hence they are subject to a kind of teleological explanation. Similarly, the idle, unnoticed movements of my fingers may have the goal of releasing the candy wrapper from my grasp.
Nevertheless, a great deal of human action has a richer psychological structure than this. An agent performs activity that is directed at a goal, and commonly it is a goal the agent has adopted on the basis of an overall practical assessment of his options and opportunities.
Moreover, it is immediately available to the agent's awareness both that he is performing the activity in question and that the activity is aimed by him at such-and-such a chosen end.
Each of the key concepts in these characterizations raises some hard puzzles. It is frequently noted that the agent has some sort of immediate awareness of his physical activity and of the goals that the activity is aimed at realizing.
For Velleman, these expectations are themselves intentions, and they are chiefly derived by the agent through practical reasoning about what she is to perform.
Setiya holds a similar view. A Weak Cognitivist, in Paul's terminology, is a theorist that holds that intentions to F are partially constituted by but are not identical with relevant beliefs that one will F.
Weak Cognitivists can construct a similar story about how the agent's own actions can, in a plausible sense, be known without relying on observation.
Consider, to illustrate the line of thought, Grice's theory of intention and belief. As noted above, he held a Weak Cognitivist view according to which an agent wills that he F s and derives from his awareness of willing that he will in fact F or at least try to F precisely because he has willed to do so.
Thus, an agent, intending to F in the near future, and being immediately aware of so intending, forms inferentially the belief that she will F soon or at least try to F precisely because she has intended to do so.
After all, the conditional,. The belief that the agent thereby derives is, although it is inferred, not derived from observation.
In the final section, we address briefly some further key issues that arise in this connection. An agent may guide her paralyzed left arm along a certain path by using her active right arm to shove it through the relevant trajectory.
The moving of her right arm, activated as it is by the normal exercise of her system of motor control, is a genuine action, but the movement of her left arm is not.
That movement is merely the causal upshot of her guiding action, just as the onset of illumination in the light bulb is the mere effect of her action when she turned on the light.
The agent has direct control over the movement of the right arm, but not over the movement of the left. It does not simply mean that behavior A , constituting a successful or attempted F ing, was initiated and causally guided throughout its course by a present-directed intention to be F ing then.
Even the externally guided movement of the paralyzed left arm would seem to satisfy a condition of this weak sort. But the proposal is dubious.
On certain assumptions, most ordinary physical actions are liable to flunk this strengthened requirement. The normal voluntary movements of an agent's limbs are caused by complicated contractions of suitable muscles, and the muscle contractions, since they are aimed at causing the agent's limbs to move, may themselves count as causally prior human actions.
As one might imagine, this conclusion depends upon how an act of moving a part of one's body is to be conceived.
Some philosophers maintain that the movements of an agent's body are never actions. This thesis re-opens the possibility that the causal guidance of the moving of the agent's leg by the pertinent intention is proximal after all.
The intention proximally governs the moving, if not the movement, where the act of moving is now thought to start at the earliest, inner stage of act initiation.
Still, this proposal is also controversial. For instance, J. Austin [] held that the statement. Some philosophers believe that the agent's moving his leg is triggered and sustained by the agent's trying to move his leg in just that way, and that the efficacious trying is itself an action [see Hornsby , Ginet , and O'Shaughnessy , ].
If, in addition, the agent's act of leg moving is distinct from the trying, then, again, the moving of the leg has not been caused proximally by the intention.
The truth or falsity of this third assumption is linked with a wider issue about the individuation of action that has also been the subject of elaborate discussion.
In Davidson's famous example, someone alerts a burglar by illuminating a room, which he does by turning on a light, which he does in turn by flipping the appropriate switch.
And this is so despite the fact that the alerting of the burglar was unintentional while the flipping of the switch, the turning on of the light, and the illuminating of the room were intentional.
Suppose now that it is also true that the agent moved his leg by trying to move his leg in just that matter. So, perhaps the act of trying to move the leg doesn't cause the act of moving after all, since they are just the same.
The questions involved in these debates are potentially quite confusing. First, it is important to distinguish between phrases like.
What is more, even when this distinction has been drawn, the denotations of the gerundive phrases often remain ambiguous, especially when the verbs whose nominalizations appear in these phrases are causatives.
No one denies that there is an internally complex process that is initiated by the agent's switch-flipping hand movement and that is terminated by the light's coming on as a result.
This process includes, but is not identical with, the act that initiates it and the event that is its culminating upshot. Now, the Davidson-Anscombe thesis plainly is concerned with the relation between the agent's act of turning on the light, his act of flipping the switch, etc.
But which configuration of events, either prior to or contained within the extended causal process of turning on the light, really constitutes the agent's action?
It has proved difficult to argue for one choice over another without simply begging the question against competing positions. As noted before, Hornsby and other authors have pointed to the intuitive truth of.
On this view, the act of trying — which is the act of moving — causes a movement of the arm in much the same way that an act of moving the arm causes the onset of illumination in the light.
Both the onset of illumination and the overt arm movement are simply causal consequences of the act itself, the act of trying to move his arm in just this way.
Further, in light of the apparent immediacy and strong first person authority of agents' judgements that they have tried to do a certain thing, it appears that acts of trying are intrinsically mental acts.
So, a distinctive type of mental act stands as the causal source of the bodily behavior that validates various physical re-descriptions of the act.
If this is true of trying to perform basic acts e. In this case, the something which was done may simply consist in the contracting of the agent's muscles.
Or, perhaps, if we focus on the classic case of the person whose arm, unknown to her, is paralyzed, then the trying in that case and perhaps in all may be nothing more than the activation of certain neural systems in the brain.
Of course, most agents are not aware that they are initiating appropriate neural activity, but they are aware of doing something that is meant to make their arms move.
And, in point of fact, it may well be that the something of which they are aware as a causing of the arm movement just is the neural activity in the brain.
Rather, it gives us a way of describing actions in terms of a goal aimed at in the behavior without committing us as to whether the goal was realized or not.
It also carries no commitment,. By contrast, it is a familiar doctrine that what the agent does, in the first instance, in order to cause his arm to move is to form a distinctive mental occurrence whose intrinsic psychological nature and content is immediately available to introspection.
The agent wills his arm to move or produces a volition that his arm is to move, and it is this mental willing or volition that is aimed at causing his arm to move.
Just as an attempt to turn on the light may be constituted by the agent's flipping of the switch, so also, in standard cases, trying to move his arm is constituted by the agent's willing his arm to move.
It is quite another matter to argue successfully that the initiating activity has the particular mentalistic attributes that volitionalism has characteristically ascribed to acts of willing.
It is also a further question whether there is only a single action, bodily or otherwise, that is performed along the causal route that begins with trying to move and terminates with a movement of the chosen type.
One possibility, adverted to above, is that there is a whole causal chain of actions that is implicated in the performance of even the simplest physical act of moving a part of one's body.
On this approach, there may be nothing which is the act of flipping the switch or of turning on the light, because each causal link is now an act which flipped the switch and thereby turned on the light [see Wilson ].
Nevertheless, there still will be a single overt action that made the switch flip, the light turn on, and the burglar become alert, i.
However, all of this discussion suppresses a basic metaphysical mystery. In the preceding two paragraphs, it has been proposed that the neural activity, the muscle contractions, and the overt hand movements may all be actions, while the switch's flipping on, the light's coming on, and the burglar's becoming alert are simply happenings outside the agent, the mere effects of the agent's overt action.
As we have seen, there is plenty of disagreement about where basic agency starts and stops, whether within the agent's body or somewhere on its surface.
There is less disagreement that the effects of bodily movement beyond the body, e. Still, what could conceivably rationalize any set of discriminations between action and non-action as one traces along the pertinent complex causal chains from the initial mind or brain activity, through the bodily behavior, to the occurrences produced in the agent's wider environment?
Perhaps, one wants to say, as suggested above, that the agent has a certain kind of direct motor control over the goal-seeking behavior of his own body.
In virtue of that fundamental biological capacity, his bodily activity, both inner and overt, is governed by him and directed at relevant objectives.
Inner physical activity causes and is aimed at causing the overt arm movements and, in turn, those movements cause and are aimed at causing the switch to flip, the light to go on, and the room to become illuminated.
Emphasizing considerations of this sort, one might urge that they validate the restriction of action to events in or at the agent's body.
It is a goal for the agent of the switch's flipping on that it turn on the light, a goal for the agent of the onset of illumination in the room that it render the room space visible, etc.
The earlier remarks in this section hint at the serious difficulty of seeing how any such routes are likely to provide a rationale for grounding the requisite metaphysical distinction s.
For example, although it may be true that. A specification of the intention with which an agent acted or the intention that the agent had in acting provides a common type of explanation of why the agent acted as he did.
This observation will be examined at some length in Section 3. Statements of form 5 are ascriptions of intention for the future , although, as a special case, they include ascriptions of present-directed intentions , i.
Statements of form 6 , ascriptions of acting intentionally , bear close connections to corresponding instances of 7.
As a first approximation at least, it is plausible that 6 is true just in case. However, several authors have questioned whether such a simple equivalence captures the special complexities of what it is to G intentionally.
Suppose that Betty kills Jughead, and she does so with the intention of killing him. And yet suppose also that her intention is realized only by a wholly unexpected accident.
The bullet she fires misses Jughead by a mile, but it dislodges a tree branch above his head and releases a swarm of hornets that attack him and sting him until he dies.
In this case, it is at least dubious that, in this manner, Betty has killed Jughead intentionally. It is equally doubtful that Betty killed him unintentionally either.
Or suppose that Reggie wins the lottery, and having bizarre illusions about his ability to control which ticket will win, he enters the lottery and wins it with the intention of winning it [Mele ].
The second suggests that the agent's success in G ing must result from her competent exercise of the relevant skills, and it must not depend too much on sheer luck, whether the luck has been foreseen or not.
The wristband guides you through the game zones. Check the leaderboards, get motivated and choose your games. First, we designed Action Stadium for kids only.
But then their parents wanted to play too. We took a U-turn and opened our doors to everyone. Companies and other groups showed interest as well and we packaged some for them too.
We are now looking for real estate owners to join our movement. The lifestyle we represent is an international phenomenon. Our concept is born global and comes in three sizes: small, medium and large.
Space and location set requirements for choosing the right one. The ideal setting would be 2. Be more active - with Nordic-inspired, challenging gamified experiences.
Up to 40 different games and activities All easy to adopt.
Das Auswahlverfahren erfolgt durch ein Sichtungsseminar und ein nachfolgendes Praktikum. Im Kern macht der Jährige heute das Gleiche wie vor 30 Jahren: dafür sorgen, dass Action-Szenen in Filmen und Serien möglichst spektakulär aussehen. Käfer Vw Athen-Krimi — Trojanische Pferde. Die Eigenproduktionen bewähren sich auf dem nationalen sowie internationalen Markt. Kimme und Dresche. Der Superbulle und Seriesever.Net Halbstarken. Crash Kids — Trust No One. Der Ballermann — Ein Bulle auf Mallorca. Hai-Alarm auf Mallorca. Die Digitalisierung sieht Joha als Chance und nicht als Problem. Auch die weltbesten Lucifer Staffel 1 Deutsch könnten den Publikumsgeschmack nicht sicher einschätzen und produzierten teure Flops. Sportwagen und Luxuslimousinen gibt es auch in München oder Düsseldorf vor jedem Bürohaus. Zudem bietet Joha über Schwesterunternehmen Dienstleistungen für nationale und internationale Filmproduktionen an, vom Luna Schaller bis zur Postproduktion.Action Concept Inhaltsverzeichnis
Abgrund — Eine Stadt stürzt ein. Namensräume Artikel Diskussion. Die Motorrad Amazon Audible Kündigen. Der Athen-Krimi — Trojanische Pferde. Good Girl, Bad Girl. Und dafür sammelt er weltweit und auch zu Hause Preise ein. Das bietet Action Concept aus einer Hand. Kimme und Dresche. Auch die weltbesten Frankensteins Kampf Gegen Die Teufelsmonster Stream könnten den Publikumsgeschmack nicht sicher einschätzen und produzierten teure Flops. When a practitioner makes sense of a situation he perceives to be unique, he sees it as something already present in his repertoire. A gallery of 40 challenging gamified sports stations to improve your wellbeing. Thus, statement ii offers Nord Nord Morde purports to be, in effect, a mere redescription of the act of F -ing. Be more active - with Nordic-inspired, challenging gamified experiences. Frankensteins Kampf Gegen Die Teufelsmonster Stream Ball. There have also been no psychological elaborations of the psychological realities of reflection in action Russell and Munby Or, perhaps, if we focus on the classic Zickenalarm of the person whose arm, unknown to her, is paralyzed, then the trying in that case and perhaps in all may be nothing more than the activation of certain neural systems in the brain. It also carries no commitment, concerning the intrinsic character of the behavior that was aimed at F ing, whether one or several Hornblower Serie were performed in the course Der Masianer trying, and whether any further bodily effects of the trying were themselves additional physical actions [see Cleveland ]. Branchen: Dienstleister / Produktionsfirmen. Action Concept Film- & Stuntproduktion GmbH. An der Hasenkaule Hürth Telefon: +49 () Von der Idee bis zum fertigen Produkt verbindet action concept alle Abläufe effizient, und hat sich seit vielen Jahren als Produzent für Auftragsproduktionen und.
An alternative response is to question to governing variables themselves, to subject them to critical scrutiny. This they describe as double-loop learning.
Such learning may then lead to an alteration in the governing variables and, thus, a shift in the way in which strategies and consequences are framed.
See Chris Argyris and double-loop learning. When they came to explore the nature of organizational learning Chris Argyris and Donald Schon described the process as follows:.
When the error detected and corrected permits the organization to carry on its present policies or achieve its presents objectives, then that error-and-correction process is single-loop learning.
Single-loop learning is like a thermostat that learns when it is too hot of too cold and turns the heat on or off. The thermostat can perform this task because it can receive information the temperature of the room and take corrective action.
Single-loop learning seems to be present when goals, values, frameworks and, to a significant extent, strategies are taken for granted.
Second, they give a new twist to pragmatic learning theory:. In other words, it is not longer necessary to go through the entire learning circle in order to develop the theory further.
It is sufficient to readjust the theory through double-loop learning ibid. To be fair to John Dewey , he did not believe it was necessary to go through a series of set stages in order to learn although he is often represented as doing so.
The notion of double-loop learning adds considerably to our appreciation of experiential learning. Usher et. Technical-rationality is a positivist epistemology of practice.
It involves looking to our experiences, connecting with our feelings, and attending to our theories in use. It entails building new understandings to inform our actions in the situation that is unfolding.
The practitioner allows himself to experience surprise, puzzlement, or confusion in a situation which he finds uncertain or unique.
He reflects on the phenomenon before him, and on the prior understandings which have been implicit in his behaviour. He carries out an experiment which serves to generate both a new understanding of the phenomenon and a change in the situation.
Schön Significantly, to do this we do not closely follow established ideas and techniques — textbook schemes. We have to think things through, for every case is unique.
However, we can draw on what has gone before. In many respects, Donald Schon is using a distinction here that would have been familiar to Aristotle — between the technical productive and the practical.
We can link this process of thinking on our feet with reflection-on-action. This is done later — after the encounter.
Workers may write up recordings, talk things through with a supervisor and so on. The act of reflecting-on-action enables us to spend time exploring why we acted as we did, what was happening in a group and so on.
In so doing we develop sets of questions and ideas about our activities and practice. The notion of repertoire is a key aspect of this approach.
Practitioners build up a collection of images, ideas, examples and actions that they can draw upon. Donald Schon, like John Dewey , saw this as central to reflective thought.
When a practitioner makes sense of a situation he perceives to be unique, he sees it as something already present in his repertoire. To see this site as that one is not to subsume the first under a familiar category or rule.
It is, rather, to see the unfamiliar, unique situation as both similar to and different from the familiar one, without at first being able to say similar or different with respect to what.
The familiar situation functions as a precedent, or a metaphor, or… an exemplar for the unfamiliar one. In this way we engage with a situation.
When looking at a situation we are influenced by, and use, what has gone before, what might come, our repertoire, and our frame of reference.
We are able to draw upon certain routines. As we work we can bring fragments of memories into play and begin to build theories and responses that fit the new situation.
First, the distinction between reflection in and on action has been the subject of some debate see Eraut and Usher et al There have also been no psychological elaborations of the psychological realities of reflection in action Russell and Munby However, when we take reflection in and on action together it does appear that Schon has hit upon something significant.
However, such processes cannot be repeated in full for everything we do. There is a clear relationship between reflection in and on action.
People draw upon the processes, experiences and understandings generated through reflection on action.
In turn, things can be left and returned to. We have to take certain things as read. We have to fall back on routines in which previous thought and sentiment has been sedimented.
It is here that the full importance of reflection-on-action becomes revealed. As we think and act, questions arise that cannot be answered in the present.
The space afforded by recording, supervision and conversation with our peers allows us to approach these. Reflection requires space in the present and the promise of space in the future.
Smith Second, there is some question as to the extent to which his conceptualisation of reflective practice entails praxis. While there is a clear emphasis on action being informed, there is less focus on the commitments entailed.
While he does look at values and interpretative systems, it is the idea of repertoire that comes to the fore.
In other words what he tends to look at is the process of framing and the impact of frame-making on situations:. As [inquirers] frame the problem of the situation, they determine the features to which they will attend, the order they will attempt to impose on the situation, the directions in which they will try to change it.
In this process, they identify both the ends to be sought and the means to be employed. The ability to draw upon a repertoire of metaphors and images that allow for different ways of framing a situation is clearly important to creative practice and is a crucial insight.
We can easily respond in inappropriate ways in situations through the use of an ill-suited frame. However, what we also must hold in view is some sense of what might make for the good see Smith Al It may well be that this failure to attend to method and to problematize the production of his models and ideas has also meant that his contribution in this area has been often used in a rather unreflective way by trainers.
As such they have suffered from being approached in ways that would have troubled Donald Schon. For him reflective practice was to be enacted.
In a similar fashion, his work with Chris Argyris still features very strongly in debates around organizational learning and the possibilities, or otherwise, of learning organizations.
Interestingly, though, it is difficult to find a sustained exploration of his contribution as a whole.
While there are discussions of different aspects of his thinking e. This is a great pity. Going back to books like Beyond the Stable State pays great dividends.
Argyris, M. Increasing professional effectiveness , San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Schön, D. Public and private learning in a changing society , Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Schön develops many of the themes that were to be such a significant part of his collaboration with Chris Argyris and his exploration of reflective practice.
How professionals think in action , London: Temple Smith. Influential book that examines professional knowledge, professional contexts and reflection-in-action.
Examines the move from technical rationality to reflection-in-action and examines the process involved in various instances of professional judgement.
Development of the thinking in the book with sections on understanding the need for artistry in professional education; the architectural studio as educational model for reflection-in-action; how the reflective practicum works; and implications for improving professional education.
Anderson, L. Argyris, C. Eisner, E. A personal view , Barcombe: Falmer. Etzioni, A. The theory of societal and political processes , New York: Free Press.
Finger, M. Learning our way out , London: Zed Books. Hainer, R. Glatt and M. Shelly eds. Newman, S. Pakman, M.
Ranson, R. Ranson ed. Inside the Learning Society , London: Cassell. Richardson, V. Clift, W. Houston and M. Pugach eds. Encouraging Reflective Practice in Education.
Russell, T. Schön ed. The Reflective Turn. Usher, R. Schön — Educating the reflective practitioner. Address to the meeting of the American Educational Research Association.
Acknowledgement : The picture of The Reflective Practitioner is by. How to cite this piece: Smith, M. Retrieved: insert date].
Smith First published July Last Updated on May 9, by infed. Skip to content Donald Schon Schön : learning, reflection and change.
Donald Schon made a remarkable contribution to our understanding of the theory and practice of learning.
We explore his work and some of the key themes that emerge. On the other hand, it was less than clear from her discussion how it is that intentions give rise to an alternative mode of action explanation.
By the time of this essay, he dropped the view that there is no primitive state of intending. Intentions are now accepted as irreducible, and the category of intentions is distinguished from the broad, diverse category that includes the various pro-attitudes.
In particular, he identifies intentions for the future with the agent's all-out judgments evaluations of what she is to do. Despite his altered outlook on intentions, however, Davidson does not give up the chief lines of his causal account of intentions in action — of what it is to act with a certain intention.
In the modified version,. Here is one familiar type of example. A waiter intends to startle his boss by knocking over a stack of glasses in their vicinity, but the imminent prospect of alarming his irascible employer unsettles the waiter so badly that he involuntarily staggers into the stack and knocks the glasses over.
Despite the causal role of the waiter's intention to knock over the glass, he doesn't do this intentionally. Some other causalists, including Davidson, maintain that no armchair analysis of this matter is either possible or required.
It is, after all, the present directed intention that is supposed to guide causally the ongoing activity of the agent [see also Searle ].
The example can be spelled out in such a way that it seems clear that the agent is wholly rational, in his actions and attitudes, as he knowingly pursues this bifurcated attack on his disjunctive goal but see Yaffe for skepticism about this claim.
Nevertheless, we observed at the outset that he is not. Even if Bratman's argument defeats the Simple View [see McCann , Knobe ], it doesn't rule out some type of causal analysis of acting intentionally; it doesn't even rule out such an analysis that takes the crucial controlling cause to be an intention in every instance.
The conceptual situation is complicated by the fact that Bratman holds that 7 [The agent F 'd with the intention of G ing] is ambiguous between.
The second reading does entail that the agent intends to F , and it is only the first that, according to Bratman's argument, does not.
Therefore, Bratman thinks that we need to distinguish intention as an aim or goal of actions and intention as a distinctive state of commitment to future action, a state that results from and subsequently constrains our practical endeavors as planning agents.
It can be rational to aim at a pair of ends one knows to be jointly unrealizable, because aiming at both may be the best way to realize one or the other.
However, it is not rational to plan on accomplishing both of two objectives, known to be incompatible, since intentions that figure in rational planning should agglomerate, i.
Bratman's example and the various critical discussions of it have stimulated interest in the idea of the rationality of intentions, measured against the backdrop of the agent's beliefs and suppositions.
We discuss some of these issues at greater length in Section 4. It has been mentioned earlier that Davidson came to identify intentions for the future with all out judgements about what the agent is to be doing now or should do in the relevant future.
Velleman [], by contrast, identifies an intention with the agent's spontaneous belief, derived from practical reflection, which says that he is presently doing a certain act or that he will do such an act in the future , and that his act is or will be performed precisely as a consequence of his acceptance of this self-referential belief.
Paul Grice [] favored a closely related view in which intention consists in the agent's willing that certain results ensue, combined with the belief that they will ensue as a consequence of the particular willing in question.
This causal role, he argues, is distinct from the characteristic causal or functional roles of expectations, desires, hopes, and other attitudes about the agent's future actions.
For instance, he holds that intentions and beliefs are structurally parallel in the following key respect. Both involve the endorsing of an appropriate type of structured content.
Orders, commands, and requests all have practitions as their contents as well, but, as a rule, these will represent prescriptions directed at others.
They express the content, e. Other philosophers, e. Still others, notably Annette Bair [], have wanted to construe the logical objects of intending as non-propositional and as represented by an unmodified infinitive.
Castaneda was concerned to assign a systematic semantics to the chief locutions that figure in practical thinking and reasoning.
It was a chief ambition in his investigations to chart out the structure of implicative relations that hold between propositions and practitions of these varied sorts and thereby to elaborate the conceptual foundations of deontic logic.
Individuals do not always act alone. They may also share intentions and act in concert. There has been growing interest in the philosophy of action about how shared intention and action should be understood.
A central concern is whether the sharing of intentions should be given a reductive account in terms of individual agency see Searle for an important early discussion of the issue.
Michael Bratman [] offers an influential proposal in a reductive vein that makes use of his planning conception of intentions. A central condition in his account of shared cooperative activity is that each participant individually intends the activity and pursues it in accordance with plans and subplans that do not conflict with those of the other participants.
But Margaret Gilbert [] has objected that reductive approaches overlook the mutual obligations between participants essential to shared activity: each participant is obligated to the others to do his or her share of the activity, and unilateral withdrawal constitutes a violation of this obligation.
Gilbert argues that a satisfactory account of these mutual obligations requires that we give up reductive individualist accounts of shared activity and posit a primitive notion of joint commitment see also Tuomela, Roth [] takes seriously the mutual obligations identified by Gilbert, and offers an account that, while non-reductive, nevertheless invokes a conception of intention and commitment that in some respects is friendlier to that invoked by Bratman.
It is not entirely clear whether, in positing primitive joint commitments, Gilbert means to commit herself to the ontological thesis that there exist group agents over and above the constituent individual agents.
Pettit [] defends just such a thesis. The resulting discontinuity between individual and collective perspectives suggests, on his view, that groups can be rational, intentional agents distinct from their members.
For many years, the most intensely debated topic in the philosophy of action concerned the explanation of intentional actions in terms of the agent's reasons for acting.
As stated previously, Davidson and other action theorists defended the position that reason explanations are causal explanations — explanations that cite the agent's desires, intentions, and means-end beliefs as causes of the action [see Goldman ].
These causalists about the explanation of action were reacting against a neo-Wittgensteinian outlook that claimed otherwise.
In retrospect, the very terms in which the debate was conducted were flawed. First, for the most part, the non-causalist position relied chiefly on negative arguments that purported to show that, for conceptual reasons, motivating reasons could not be causes of action.
Davidson did a great deal to rebut these arguments. It was difficult, moreover, to find a reasonably clear account of what sort of non-causal explanation the neo-Wittgensteinians had in mind.
Unfortunately, the import of these qualifications has been less than perspicuous. George Wilson [] and Carl Ginet [] follow Anscombe in holding that reason explanations are distinctively grounded in an agent's intentions in action.
Both authors hold that ascriptions of intention in action have the force of propositions that say of a particular act of F ing that it was intended by its agent to G by means of F ing , and they claim that such de re propositions constitute non-causal reason explanations of why the agent F ed on the designated occasion.
Wilson goes beyond Ginet in claiming that statements of intention in action have the meaning of. In this analyzed form, the teleological character of ascriptions of intention in action is made explicit.
Given the goal-directed nature of action, one can provide a familiar kind of teleological explanation of the relevant behavior by mentioning a goal or purpose of the behavior for the agent at the time, and this is the information 9 conveys.
Or, alternatively, when a speaker explains that. Most causalists will allow that reason explanations of action are teleological but contend that teleological explanations in terms of goals — purposive explanations in other words — are themselves analyzable as causal explanations in which the agent's primary reason s for F ing are specified as guiding causes of the act of F ing.
Therefore, just as there are causalist analyses of what it is to do something intentionally, so there are similar counterpart analyses of teleological explanations of goal directed and, more narrowly, intentional action.
The causalist about teleological explanation maintains that the goal of the behavior for the agent just is a goal the agent had at the time, one that caused the behavior and, of course, one that caused it in the right way [for criticism, see Sehon , ].
It has not been easy to see how these disagreements are to be adjudicated. The claim that purposive explanations do or do not reduce to suitable counterpart causal explanations is surprisingly elusive.
It is not clear, in the first place, what it is for one form of explanation to reduce to another. Finally, Abraham Roth [] has pointed out that reasons explanations might both be irreducibly teleological and also cite primary reasons as efficient causes at the same time.
It is arguable that similar explanations, having both causal and teleological force, figure already in specifically homeostatic feedback explanations of certain biological phenomena.
When we explain that the organism V ed because it needed W , we may well be explaining both that the goal of the V ing was to satisfy the need for W and that it was the need for W that triggered the V ing.
In a recent article, Brian McLaughlin agrees that reason explanations are teleological, explaining an action in terms of a purpose, goal or aim for which it was performed.
He also agrees that these purposive explanations are not species of causal explanation. However, he rejects the view that these same explanations are grounded on claims about the agent's intentions in acting, and he thereby sets aside the issues, sketched above, about purpose, intention, and their role in rationalizations.
McLaughlin takes the following position: if i an agent F -ed for the purpose of G -ing, then, ii in F -ing, the agent was thereby trying to G.
To assert i is to offer an explanation of the action the F -ing in terms of the agent's trying to G. Moreover, if i is true then the act of F -ing is identical with or is a proper part of the agent's attempt to G.
Thus, statement ii offers what purports to be, in effect, a mere redescription of the act of F -ing. Michael Thompson has defended a position that makes a rather radical break from the familiar post-Davidson views on the explanation of action.
He rejects as misconceived the debates between causalist and non-causalist accounts of explaining action. He does not deny that actions are sometimes explained by appeal to wants, intentions, and attempts, but he thinks that the nature of these explanations is radically misunderstood in standard theorizing.
Thompson's overall position is novel, complex, and highly nuanced. It is sometimes elusive, and it is certainly not easy to summarize briefly.
Nevertheless, it is a recent approach that has rapidly been drawing growing interest and support. One of the principal arguments that was used to show that reason explanations of action could not be causal was the following.
If the agent's explaining reasons R were among the causes of his action A , then there must be some universal causal law which nomologically links the psychological factors in R together with other relevant conditions to the A -type action that they rationalize.
However, it was argued, there simply are no such psychological laws; there are no strict laws and co-ordinate conditions that ensure that a suitable action will be the invariant product of the combined presence of pertinent pro-attitudes, beliefs, and other psychological states.
Therefore, reasons can't be causes. Davidson accepted that the thesis, on this reading, is correct, and he has continued to accept it ever since.
The stronger reading says that there are no reason-to-action laws in any guise, including laws in which the psychological states and events are re-described in narrowly physical terms and the actions are re-described as bare movement.
Davidson affirms that there are laws of this second variety, whether we have discovered them or not. Many have felt that this position only lands Davidson qua causalist in deeper trouble.
It is not simply that we suppose that states of having certain pro-attitudes and of having corresponding means-end beliefs are among the causes of our actions.
We suppose further that the agent did what he did because the having of the pro-attitude and belief were states with respectively a conative and a cognitive nature, and even more importantly, they are psychological states with certain propositional contents.
The agent F 'ed at a given time, we think, because, at that time, he had a desire that represented F ing, and not some other act, as worthwhile or otherwise attractive to him.
Fred Dretske [] gave a famous example in this connection. When the soprano's singing of the aria shatters the glass, it will have been facts about the acoustic properties of the singing that were relevant to the breaking.
The breaking does not depend upon the fact that she was singing lyrics and that those lyrics expressed such-and-such a content.
In the case of action, by contrast, we believe that the contents of the agent's attitudes are causally relevant to behavior.
The contents of the agent's desires and beliefs not only help justify the action that is performed but, according to causalists at least, they play a causal role in determining the actions the agent was motivated to attempt.
It has been difficult to see how Davidson, rejecting laws of mental content as he does, is in any position to accommodate the intuitive counterfactual dependence of action on the content of the agent's motivating reasons.
His theory seems to offer no explication whatsoever of the fundamental role of mental content in reason explanations. Nevertheless, it should be admitted that no one really has a very good theory of how mental content plays its role.
An enormous amount of research has been conducted to explicate what it is for propositional attitudes, realized as states of the nervous system, to express propositional contents at all.
Without some better consensus on this enormous topic, we are not likely to get far on the question of mental causation, and solid progress on the attribution of content may still leave it murky how the contents of attitudes can be among the causal factors that produce behavior.
In a fairly early phase of the debate over the causal status of reasons for action, Norman Malcolm [] and Charles Taylor [] defended the thesis that ordinary reason explanations stand in potential rivalry with the explanations of human and animal behavior the neural sciences can be expected to provide.
More recently, Jaegwon Kim [] has revived this issue in a more general way, seeing the two modes of explanation as joint instances of a Principle of Explanatory Exclusion.
Influenced by Davidson, many philosophers reject more than just reason-to-action laws. They believe, more generally, that there are no laws that connect the reason-giving attitudes with any material states, events, and processes, under purely physical descriptions.
Just as certain function explanations in biology may not reduce to, but also certainly do not compete with, related causal explanations in molecular biology, so also non-causal reason explanations could be expected to co-exist with neural analyses of the causes of behavior.
Earlier we introduced the Cognitivist view that intentions are special kinds of beliefs, and that, consequently, practical reasoning is a special form of theoretical reasoning.
But an opposing tradition has been at least as equally prominent in the last twenty-five years of thinking about the nature of intention.
Philosophers in this tradition have turned their attention to the project of giving an account of intention that captures the fact that intentions are distinctive mental states, states which play unique roles in psychological explanations and which are subject to their own sorts of normative requirements.
On the simple desire-belief model, an intention is a combination of desire-belief states, and an action is intentional in virtue of standing in the appropriate relation to these simpler states.
For example, to say that someone intentionally turns on the air conditioner is just to explain her action by appealing to e.
Bratman motivated the idea that intentions are psychologically real and not reducible to desire-belief complexes by observing that they are motivationally distinctive, and subject to their own unique standards of rational appraisal.
First, he noted that intentions involve characteristic kinds of motivational commitment. Intentions are conduct controlling, in the sense that if you intend to F at t, and nothing changes before t, then other things equal you will F.
The same is clearly not true for desire; we habitually resist present-directed desires. Intentions resist reconsideration—they are relatively stable, in the sense that we take ourselves to be settled on a course of action when we intend it, and it seems to be irrational to reconsider an intention absent specific reason for doing so.
In addition, intentions put pressure on us to form further intentions in order to more efficiently coordinate our actions.
When we intend to go to the park, for example, we feel pressure to form intentions concerning how to get there, what to bring, etc.
Again, desires do not appear to be subject to norms of non-reconsideration, and they do not seem to put pressure on us to form further desires about means.
Bratman went on to provide a more rigorous characterization of the constitutive norms on intention, a characterization that has been hugely influential.
The applicability of these requirements to states of intention was, for Bratman, a further strike against the desire-belief model. The first norm requires agents to make their intentions consistent with one another.
Imagine that Mike intends to go to the game, and also intends to refrain from going. Mike seems obviously irrational. Yet it would be in no way irrational for Mike to desire to go to the game and to desire to refrain from going.
So it appears that the irrationality of having inconsistent intentions cannot be explained by appealing to run of the mill norms on desire and belief.
Likewise, intentions seem subject to a norm of means-end coherence. If Mike intends to go to the game, and believes that he must buy a ticket in advance in order to go, then he is obviously irrational if he does not intend to buy a ticket provided he persists in intending to go to the game.
Again, merely desiring to go to the game, and believing that going to the game requires buying a ticket, would not be sufficient to render Mike irrational in the event that he failed to desire to buy one.
So again it appears that the norms on beliefs and desires cannot suffice to generate the norms on intentions.
Finally, Bratman claimed that rational agents have intentions that are consistent with their beliefs. The exact nature of this intention-belief consistency norm has since been the subject of considerable attention [Bratman , Wallace , Yaffe ].
But the general idea is that it is irrational to intend to F while also believing that one will not F —this would amount to an objectionable form of inconsistency.
Yet desiring to F while believing that one will not F seems like no rational error at all. As Bratman himself points out, it seems perfectly possible, and not irrational, to intend to stop at the library without believing that I will recognizing, say, my own forgetful nature.
If that is correct, then it is not immediately obvious why I could not permissibly intend to stop while also believing that I will not.
For example, consider again the norm of intention consistency, which convicts Mike of error when he intends to go to the game and also intends to refrain from going.
Above we suggested that this norm could not be explained by appealing to norms on desire, since it is permissible to have inconsistent desires.
But now imagine that the intention to F just is or necessarily involves the belief that one will F. Then intending to F , and intending to refrain from F -ing, will entail that one has contradictory beliefs.
So if the Cognitivist can help himself to this constitutive claim about the link between intending and believing, he appears to have an attractive explanation of the norm requiring intention consistency.
The status of this constitutive claim, and of the plausibility of deriving other norms e. Of course, if Bratman was right to contend that one can intend to F without believing that she will F , then the Cognitivist picture of intention seems doomed from the get-go.
Seen in another light, then, the conclusion that intentions are psychologically real and irreducible to simpler states may be vindicated by way of a critique of the motivations for Cognitivism.
In this vein, some philosophers notably Sarah Paul have influentially argued that the Cognitivist is committed to an unattractive picture of the justification of intention formation.
It seems to follow that intending constitutively involves forming a belief for which I lack sufficient evidence.
Indeed, it appears that the only sort of consideration potentially counting in favor of the belief that I will F is my preference that this proposition turns out true.
So intending appears to be a form of wishful thinking on the Cognitivist picture of intentions. This can be seen as a troubling result, given that we ordinarily regard wishful thinking as deeply irrational and intending as perfectly rational.
The issues about intention just canvassed are an instance of a more general project of understanding the nature of our mental states by understanding the normative requirements that apply to them.
But the idea that there are distinctive norms on intention has been challenged from another direction as well. Niko Kolodny , , makes the skeptical claim that we have no reason to be rational, and one main consequence of this thought is that there are no distinctively rational norms on our propositional attitudes at all.
Raz argues for a similar claim, but restricts his skepticism to what he regards as the mythical norm of means-end coherence. If Kolodny were correct, then the rational norms on intention would be explicable by appeal to the same principles as the norms on belief, and any other normatively assessable attitudes—and would moreover be, at best, pseudo-norms, or principles that merely appear normative to us.
This would not amount to a win for Cognitivism, since the explanation would turn on underlying features of all reasoning processes, and not on any necessary connection between the possession of intentions and beliefs.
In any event, this skeptical view about the authority and autonomy of rationality is highly controversial, and depends on disputed claims about reasoning and the logical form of rational requirements see Bridges , Broome , , Schroeder , , Finlay , Brunero , Shpall , Way Finally, Richard Holton , has initiated a new direction in contemporary work on the nature of intention with his advocacy of a novel theory of partial intentions.
On his view, partial intentions are intention-like states that figure as sub-strategies in the context of larger, more complex plans to accomplish a given end.
Such partial intentions are, Holton thinks, necessary for adequately rich psychological explanations: merely appealing to full intentions cannot succeed in capturing the wide range of phenomena that intention-like states appear to explain.
And much like credential doxastic states, partial intentions will presumably bring with them their own sets of norms.
Again, merely desiring to go to the game, Prosieben Maxx Stream believing that going to the game requires buying a ticket, would not be sufficient to render Mike irrational in the event that he failed to desire to buy one. One of the principal arguments that was used to show that reason explanations of action could not be causal was the following. We have to fall back on routines in which previous thought and sentiment has been sedimented. So, perhaps the act of trying to Duell Der Magier Stream Deutsch the leg doesn't cause the act of moving after all, since they are just the Snow White And The Huntsman Stream Kinox. There has been a notable or notorious debate about whether the agent's reasons in acting are Steinzeit Junior Dvd of Action Concept action — a longstanding debate about the character of our common sense explanations of actions. How professionals think in action 6 Wochen Vorschau Btn, London: Temple Smith. Potential sponsor? Brad Pitt Filmy ideal setting would be 2.Action Concept Relacionados Video
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